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The Ohio Annulment Law:
A Beginning But Not An End
7HE OHIO ANNULMENT statute, passed during the 1963 session
of the Ohio General Assembly,' brings some badly needed re-
forms. However, it also provides the basis for much confusion and
unnecessary litigation. This Note will point out and discuss both
the strong and weak points of the statute; it is not intended, how-
ever, to be an exhaustive treatment of all the inconsistencies. Clari-
fication of the statute is greatly needed,2 and it is hoped that the dis-
cussion herein will aid in apprising domestic relations attorneys of
the applicable Ohio law in this area.
I. THE STATUTE
The new Ohio annulment statute3 provides that each of the
designated grounds for annulment must have existed at the time
1. This act, Sub. H.B. No. 467, became effective on September 24, 1963. BATEMAN,
OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY BULL., 105TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY - REGULAR SESSION
327 (Recess ed. 1964).
2. In fairness to the sponsors of the statute, it should be noted that it represents the
first piece of legislation enacted by the Ohio General Assembly in the last ten years
in the field of family law. Judge Walter G. Whitlatch of the Cuyahoga County Juven-
ile Court and a member of the Family Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion pointed out several instances wherein the Committee was forced to extract certain
desirable provisions from the bill for fear that the entire bill would fail to pass. In
1963, Judge Whitlatch commented on the enactment of this statute as follows:
Several significant substantive and procedural changes were effected in
the field of family law by the 105th General Assembly. Most of these arose
from the activities of the Family Law Committee, which enjoyed a highly
successful legislative session. Much credit must go to the itaff of the Bar
Association and to the Family Law Committee ... for the salutary and progres-
sive provisions which were written into law relating to domestic relations.
Perhaps the most noteworthy Family Law legislative accomplishment was
the enactment of an annulment statute, which became effective on September
24, 1963. 2 OHIo STATE BAR As'N SERVICE LETTrER (Family Law ed.
Nov., 1963).
Also helpful in interpreting the act are the comments of Mr. Judson Hoy, head of
the House Judiciary Committee at the time of the passage of the act, communicated to
the author by letter during the course of the preparation of this Note. However, Mr.
Hoy cautions that the Committee comments are no longer in existence, and thus his
statements expressed herein as to the intention of the Committee in enacting the sections
of the statute are from memory.
3. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3105.31-.34 (Supp. 1964). [hereinafter cited as CODE 5J-
CODE § 3105.31 provides:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the
time of the marriage:
(A) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was under the age at which persons may be joined in marriage (as
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of the marriage.' For example, a marriage may be annulled by
the parent or guardian on the grounds of non-age.5 Thus, where
the male is under the age of eighteen or the female is under the
age of sixteen, the marriage may be annulled by the parent or
guardian of the non-age party.6 But this right ends as soon as the
non-age party reaches the proper age. Also, within two years after
attaining the proper age, the non-age party may annul the marriage,
unless he or she has cohabited with the other party after reaching
the age of consent.7
The new statute also provides that where one of the parties to
the marriage has a previously valid marriage, the present marriage
may be annulled by either party to the marriage, or by the spouse
established) by section 3101.01 of the Revised Code [males-eighteen; females-
sixteen], unless after attaining such age such party cohabited with the other
as husband or wife;
(B) That the former husband or wife of either party was living and the
marriage with such former husband or wife was then and still is in force;
(C) That either party has been adjudicated to be mentally incompetent,
unless such party after being restored to competency cohabited with the other
as husband or wife;
(D) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, co-
habited with the other as husband or wife;,
(E) That the consent to the marriage of either party was obtained by force,
unless such party afterwards cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(F) That the marriage between the parties was never consummated although
otherwise valid.
CODE § 3105.32 provides:
An action to obtain a decree of nullity of a marriage must be commenced
within the periods and by the parties as follows:
(A) For the cause mentioned in division (A) of section 3105.31 of the
Revised Code, by the party to the marriage who was married under the age at
which persons may be joined in marriage as established by section 3101.01 ...
within two years after arriving at such age; or by a parent, guardian, or by
other person having charge of such party at any time before such party has
arrived at such age;
(B) For cause mentioned in division (B) of section 3105.31 . . . by either
party during the life of the other or by such former husband or wife;
(C) For cause mentioned in division (C) of section 3105.31 . . . by the
party aggrieved or a relative or guardian of the party adjudicated mentally in-
competent at any time before the death of either party;
(D) For causes mentioned in division (D) of section 3105.31 . . . by the
party aggrieved within two years after the discovery of the facts constituting
fraud;
(E) For the cause mentioned in division (E) of section 3105.31 . . . by
the party aggrieved within two years from the date of the said marriage;
(F) For the cause mentioned in division (F) of section 3105.31 ... by the
party aggrieved within two years from the date of marriage.
4. CODE § 3105.31 (Supp. 1964).
5. CODE § 3105.31(A) (Supp. 1964).
6. CODE § 3105.32(A) (Supp. 1964).
7. CODE § 3105.31(A) (Supp. 1964).
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of. the prior marriage. This action must be brought during the
lifetime of both parties to the bigamous marriage!
Where one of the parties has been adjudicated mentally in-
competent, he or she may annul the marriage within two years
after having been restored to competency? Where a party is not
restored to competency, a relative or guardian of the incompetent
spouse may annul the marriage at any time prior to the death of
either party.'" Also, where the consent of one of the parties to the
marriage was procured by fraud, sections 3105.31 (D) and 3105.32
(D) provide that that party may annul the marriage within two
years after discovery of the true facts.' However, if the victim of the
fraud freely cohabits with the spouse with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, the action is barred.'" A party to a
marriage whose consent was obtained by force may also annul
within two years of the date of the marriage. 3 But here also,
voluntary cohabitation will preclude the action.
Where a marriage is otherwise valid, but has never been con-
summated, the marriage may be annulled by the "party aggrieved"
within two years from the date of the marriage.' But whether
the marriage is characterized as void or voidable for other purposes,
all children that are a result thereof are considered legitimate for
all purposes."
II. THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT
Each of the areas covered by the statute will now receive separate
attention. More specifically, these areas will be analyzed'in terms
of: (1) what the common law was prior to the enactment of the
8. CODE §§ 3105.31(B),.32(B) (Supp. 1964)..
9. CODE § 3105.31(C) (Supp. 1964).
10. CODE § 3105.32(C) (Supp. 1964).
11. CODE §§ 3105.31(D), .32(D) (Supp. 1964).
12. CODE § 3105.32(D) (Supp. 1964).
13. CODE §§ 3105.31(E), .32(E) (Supp. 1964).
14. CODE §§ 3105.31(F),.32(F) (Supp. 1964).
15. CODE § 3105.33 (Supp. 1964). However, this section merely restates the exist-
ing Ohio law on the subject. In addition, CODE §§ 2101.03, 3105.03, .05-.11, .14-.15,
and .21 were amended by adding the words "and annulment." This integrated the
annulment remedy into the procedural sections of the divorce chapter. In commenting
on this aspect of the new law, Judge Whitlatch stated: "Heretofore, an action in an-
nulment has been cognizable only in equity, with the procedure... being so ill-defined
and confusing as to discourage its use in setting aside void or voidable marriages. The
statutory enactment dearly defines the procedural... law relating to annulment The
statutory procedure for an annulment action is almost identical with that of a divorce
action; this was accomplished by adding the word 'annulment' to the divorce procedural
statutes." 2 OHio STATE BAR ASS'N SERVICE LETTI (Family Law ed. Nov., 1963).
19651
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section under discussion; (2) how, if at all, the section has changed
the common law; and (3) whether these changes are progressive
or regressive.
A. Non-age
Prior to the enactment of the new annulment statute, Ohio
followed the majority common law view that the parents of a
non-age party could not annul a marriage." The statute changes
the law by giving the parents, guardian, or other person in charge,
an express right to annul. There have been situations where a
non-age spouse has refused to consent to an annulment, and under
the majority common law view a parent was legally power-
less to annul in such a situation. Within this frame of refer-
ence, the new provision is desirable, for if, for example, a non-age
spouse has no parents and is under the control of a guardian or other
person, the legal right to annul could well be the guardian's only
means of protecting the interests of the non-age party. Thus, since
this provision places the legal discretion of whether to annul in
persons more mature and more experienced than the parties to the
marriage, there is little doubt that this provision is a badly needed
reform. But, as will be seen later, certain injustices may occur
under the new provision in the form of too much power in the
hands of a parent or guardian.
Only twelve states 7 exclusive of Ohio have passed annulment
statutes to date. Of these twelve, every one includes non-age as
a ground for annulment, but only three allow an action on these
grounds to be brought by a parent or guardian. 8 Only the Cali-
16. Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931) (dictum); Klinebell
v. Hilton, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 637 (Ct. App. 1924).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 82-88; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1-3 (1964); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 89, 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104-106
(1952); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.030 (1963); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 14-18
(1955); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 552.1-.3 (1948); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 5-7; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-407, 411, 817, 828, 832,
(1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4701-03 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.02 (Supp.
1965).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 82 provides that "a marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: One. That the party in whose
behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was without the capability of consent-
ing thereto as provided in Section 56 of this code; unless, after attaining the age of
consent, such party for any time freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 83 provides that "an action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage,
for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods
and by the parties, as follows: . . . for causes mentioned in subdivision one: by the
party to the marriage who was married under the age of legal consent, within four years
after arriving at the age of consent; or by a parent, guardian, or other person having
[VoL 16:915
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fornia statute parallels Ohio's in that parents or guardians may
apparently annul a non-age marriage even though they had previ-
ously consented to it.'9 In all other states with annulment statutes,
previous consent by the parents prevents them from later annulling
the marriage. Thus, under the present Ohio provisions, the parents
of a fourteen year old girl would probably consent to a marriage
in order to give legitimacy to an expected child. Then, even if the
parents would annul on the day after the marriage, the child would
be legitimate since the issue of even a void marriage are held to be
legitimate in Ohio."0 This is certainly a desirable result. However,
where the non-age parties continue to cohabit as husband and wife
and do not desire a termination of the marriage, this right of the
parents to annul could result in great hardship under the new
statute. The parent or guardian would have the option of annulling
the marriage any time before the girl's sixteenth birthday or the
boy's eighteenth birthday, even though they had previously con-
sented to the marriage.2' Such a provision totally disregards the
charge-of such nonaged male or female, at any time before such married minor has
arrived at the age of legal consent." KY. REV. STAT. § 402.030 (1960), provides
that "courts having general equity jurisdiction may declare void any marriage obtained
by force or fraud or, at the instance of any next friend, may declare any marriage void
where'the male was under eighteen oi the female under sixteen years of age at the time
bf the mhrriage, and the marriage was without the consent of the father, mother, guar-
didn or other person lawfully having charge of his or her person and has not been rati-
fied by cohabitation after that age." (Emphasis added.) TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-407
(1955), provides that "any interested person may annul a marriage where one of the
parties thereto is under the age of sixteen where no parental consent was obtained."
(Emphasis added.)
19. Section 13 of the Model Annulment Act is also in accord: "A marriage is annul-
lable if, at the time of the marriage, the male party is under the age of eighteen or the
femalq party is under the age of sixteen, whether or not a parent, guardian or person
in- charge of such underage party consents to the marriage," Vernon, Annulment of
Marriage: A Proposed Model Act, 12.J. PuB. L. 143, 181 (1963).
20. CODE § 3105.33 (Supp. 1964). - Under CODE § 3101.04, the Juvenile Court can
give consent to a non-age marriage where illegitimate children would otherwise result.
In this situation, the parents of the non-age spouse presumably would not have the right
to annul.
21. The Model Annulment Act treats a non-age marriage as follows: "Where the
marriage involves a boy under eighteen or a girl under sixteen, a different problem is
presented. Here the state does not permit the parents to consent, and the [county
prosecutor] ... should be given the power to proceed to have the marriage annulled
in order to prevent a flouting of the state's policy." Vernon, supra note 19, at 169.
Section 13 of the Model Act allows an annulment action to be brought by a parent,
guardian, or prosecuting attorney whether or not the parent or other person in charge
of the under age party consented to the marriage. However, § 13 (C) (3) of the Model
Act limits such action to the first year of the marriage. To some extent, this provision
mitigates the inequities which could arise under Ohio law. However, even one year is
too long. If the parent wishes to annul, he should be required to act immediately.
Therefore, action by a parent or guardian should be limited to sixty days from the time
of the non-age marriage or from the time of its discovery, whichever is later. See Ver-
non, supra note 19, at 181.
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particular facts of each case. Certainly, there will be many situa-
tions in which it is wise to allow the marriage to continue. There-
fore, it would seem that a more just result could be reached by
providing that the parents will be bound by their initial consent,
or at least be required to act within a very short time after the
marriage or its discovery. It is undesirable for them to have a con-
tinuing power to annul.'
Another injustice which could arise in this area involves the
widow's share of her non-age spouse's life insurance policy. Sup-
pose, for example, that a seventeen year old husband is killed leav-
ing his wife but no children as dependents. His life insurance policy
names his wife as the beneficiary. The husband's parents who
previously consented to the marriage, could bring action to annul
the marriage since such an action is not barred by the death of the
non-age party.a The parents could then claim that the annul-
ment related back to the date of the marriage; 4 that consequently
22. The non-age parties themselves have always had this continuing power to annul.
Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884) and In re Zemmick's Estate, 76 N.E.2d 902
(Ohio Ct. App. 1946) indicate that the non-age party himself could ratify either by
cohabitation or some other overt act. But the ratification was not effective until the
underage party reached the age of consent. The non-age party could cohabit until
reaching the age of consent without having ratified the marriage. So, presumably this
party could annul upon reaching the age of consent. Thus, at common law, the non-age
party could cohabit until the day before his eighteenth birthday and then annul. While
the statute has not changed this situation, there appears to be no valid reason for ex-
tending this continuing power of annulment to the parents as well.
23. CODE § 3105.32(A) (Supp. 1964).
24. Traditionally, annulment of a void marriage relates back to the time of the mar-
riage, whereas the decree becomes effective only when rendered in the case of a voidable
marriage. Note, 7 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1955). However, it is not clear in Ohio
whether a non-age marriage is void or voidable. Shafher v. State, 20 Ohio 1 (1851),
held that such a marriage was void and therefore could be collaterally attacked and set
aside without need of judicial decree. Accord, Carlton v. Carlton, 76 Ohio App. 338,
64 N.E.2d 428 (1945); Gill v. Gill, 2 Ohio L Abs. 14 (Ct. App. 1923); State v. Wil-
cox, 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 343 (Juv. Ct. 1926); Ott v. Ott, 3 Ohio Dec. 684 (C.P.
1895); Vernon v. Vernon, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 365 (C.P. 1884). Contra, In re
Zemmick's Estate, 76 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App.
276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931); Pearlman v. Pearlman, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 46 (C.P.
1928); Klinebell v. Hilton, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 167 (C.P. 1924); Allen v. Allen, 21
Ohio L. Rep. 313 (C.P. 1923). CODE § 3105.31(A) (Supp. 1964), causes a non-age
marriage to be subject to collateral attack by the parents or guardian. This is at least
one factor to be considered, and it supports the concept of a void rather than a voidable
marriage. While the Ohio act does not deal directly with the void and voidable con-
cept, Mr. Judson Hoy, head of the House Judiciary Committee at the time of the statute's
passage, pointed out in a letter to the author that "these marriages are voidable only
for the reason that section 3105.32 provides time limitations for bringing annulment
actions and unless an action is brought within the time limitation the marriage is con-
sidered a valid one." Letter From Mr. Judson Hoy to the Author, Feb. 8, 1965. But
since a non-age marriage may be collaterally attacked by the parent or guardian, it is
still possible that a decree of nullity would relate back to the time of the marriage.
It has been suggested that a void-voidable classification has no place in modern
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there never was a wife and that the insurance proceeds should
thus go to the parents of the deceased according to the laws of
intestacy.25 Even if the court would not come to this result,
the dependent widow is still forced to pay attorney's fees for litiga-
tion which could have been prevented by a provision forcing a par-
ent or guardian to annul within sixty days after discovery of the
marriage or be thereafter precluded from bringing the action.27
annulment legislation. The preferable alternative would be to allow the courts to deter-
mine the nature of the defect on a case by case basis. Vernon, supra note 19, at 150;
see also Ross, The Ohio Law of Marriage, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 724, 737-39 (1963).
25. CODE S 2105.06(E) (Supp..1964), provides that "if there is no spouse and no
children or their lineal decendents, [the money or property goes) to the parents of such
intestate equally, or to the surviving parent." Of course, if the marriage did produce
children, the proceeds would go to them per stirpes. CODE § 2105.06(B) (Supp.
1964).
26. It is generally held that a party is not precluded by lack of clean hands, estoppel,
or laches where the marriage is void. Note, 7 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1955). It is there-
fore highly possible that a court would, under the present Ohio law, reach the inequita-
ble result discussed.
27. One problem which the non-age section of the Ohio statute has entirely avoided
is that of marriages between those under the age of twenty-one but above the non-age
limit. Even though a person under twenty-one requires his parents' consent to enter into
a marriage in Ohio, if he does so without their consent the parents are powerless to act
and the marriage is valid. This renders the requirement of parental consent illusory.
Section 12 of the Model Annulment Act deals with this problem as follows:
(A) A marriage is annullable if, at the time of the marriage, the male party
is eighteen, nineteen or twenty years old or the female party is sixteen or
seventeen years old, unless consent to the marriage is given by a parent, guar-
dian or person in charge of the underage party.
(B) The consent contemplated by subsection A of this section shall be
deemed given if the parent, guardian or other person in charge of the under-
age party
(1) is present at the marriage and does not protest; or
(2) signs a written consent to the marriage which is authenticated be-
fore a competent authority. Such written consent may be given either
before or after the marriage.
(C) A marriage described as annullable in subsection A of this section may
be annulled in an action brought by
(1) the party who was underage at the time of the marriage; or
(2) a parent, guardian or person in charge of such underage party.
(D) A marriage described as annullable in subsection A of this section shall
not be annulled
(1) if the parties live together as husband and wife after the underage
party or parties reach the age of consent; or
(2) if the action is brought more than one year after the underage party
or parties reach the age of consent. Vernon, supra note 19, at 180-81.
Some changes have recently been proposed, pointing up some of the problems en-
countered in this area:
A clampdown on juvenile marriages - with all applicants under 21 being
questioned under oath about their background, social and financial respon-
sibility, means of livelihood and other key factors - is being proposed as an
Ohio law.
The move to cut down the rate of under-21 marriages is being urged by
1965]
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B. Mental Incompetency
Under the present statutory provision,2" only a person who has
been adjudicated mentally incompetent at the time of the marriage
may have the marriage annulled. 9 At the common law, any
mentally incompetent person, whether or not under an actual
adjudication, could annul a marriage. None of the other states
which have annulment statutes require an actual adjudication. Even
the California statute, upon which the Ohio statute is patterned,
does not so provide.3" This is a highly unusual provision, and
it could lead to anomalous results.
At common law, in order to enter into a valid marriage, each
of the parties must have understood not only the nature and
quality of the marriage contract, but also the duties and re-
sponsibilities of the status.3 ' The reason for allowing annulment in
such a situation is obvious. For example, if the aggrieved party
has given consent to enter into a contractual relationship, the nature
of which neither he nor she understands, surely there can be no
doubt that upon restoration to. competency such party should have
Common Pleas Judge Roy C. Scott and State Senator David T. Matia in a-group
of far-reaching reforms in Ohio's marriage and divorce laws. •
.Three out of five juvenile marriages end in divorce court within three to
four years, Scott and Matia pointed out. Scott is secretary of the family law
committee of the Ohio State Bar Association.
To cut down the growing number of juvenile divorces, Scott and Maria
also recommended the transfer to Juvenile Court jurisdiction of all divorce and
support actions involving spouses under 21....
Their proposed law revisions also would:
Make it illegal for any male to take a. girl under twenty-one outside Ohio
for the -purpose of marriage without the consent of her parents or guardians.
Raise the minimum age for girls from 16 to 18 with the consent of a par-
ent.... The requirement of parents' consent under age 21 would remain, un-
changed. Nussbaum, Moves Proposed to Curb Ohio Juvenile Marriages,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 4, 1965, p. 1, cols. 1-2.
28. CODE § 3105.31 (C) is taken out of the order set forth in the statute so that big-
amy, § 3105.31 (B), fraud, § 3105.31(D), and impotency, 5 3105.3.1(F), which are
also grounds for divorce (CODE §§ 3105.01 (A), (D), (F)), may be dealt with sep-
arately.
29. CODE § 3105.31(C) (Supp. 1964).
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 82 provides that "a marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes existing at the time of the marriage: "Three. That either party was
of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabit with the
other as husband or wife." CAL. CIv. CODE § 83 provides that "an action to obtain
a decree of nullity of marriage ... must be commenced within the periods and by the
parties, as follows: ... for causes mentioned in subdivision three: by the party injured,
or relative or guardian or the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of
either party.
31. Dozer v. Dozer, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 507 (Ct. App. 1930).
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the option of invalidating the marriage.32 Yet, in Ohio, this would
not be the result unless at the time of marriage such party were
under an actual adjudiation of mental incompetency. The-Ohio
law also fails to adequately meet the situation where a party to
a marriage, although adjudicated mentally incompetent, is in fact
competent at the time of the marriage, but not restored to legal
competency by a court. In this situation, a person would be fully
aware of the nature of the marriage and yet would be allowed to
annul.
The law in Ohio prior to the enactment of the present annul-
ment statute was that the burden of proof was upon the party at-
tacking- the marriage, and that such proof had to be demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence.3" Thus, there was a strong policy
favoring the validity of a marriage which had complied with all the
statutory formalities. But, an adjudication of mental incompetency
was' treatd .as prima facie evidence of that fact. 4  It is clear that.
the legislature desired to strengthen this policy favoring the validity
of formally correct marriages in the new legislation, but in so
doing it appears to have been overextended. The present statu-
tory language provides in effect for two conclusive presumptions."3
First, there is the presumption that a person who is not under an
adjudication of mental incompetency understands the nature and
quality of the nuptial contract and its resultant duties Second, a
presumption exists that a person who is under a judicial decree of
mental incompetency "does not so understand. 6 To make these
presumptions conclusive seems completely unrealistic and will cause
harsh'results in many cases where clear evidence is available to
rebut the presumptions.
32. Section 14(A) of the Model Annulment Act provides; "A marriage is annullable
if, at the time of the marriage, either of the parties was mentally incapable of under-
standing the nature of the marriage contract." Vernon, supra note 19, at 182.
33. Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 123 (C.P. 1924). For a discussion of the
Ohio law in this area prior to the new enactments see Note, Annulment Problems in
Ohio, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 73 (1953).
34. Ibid.
35. CoDE § 3105.31(C) (Supp. 1964).
36. Mr. Judson Hoy informed the author that it was the Committee's "intention that
a person who was in fact mentally incompetent but not so adjudicated at the time of
his marriage not be allowed to annul. I believe that this is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the annulment statute, but the majority of the committee was concerned with
problems of proof." Letter From Mr. Judson Hoy to the Author, Feb. 8, 1965. It is
conceded that it would be extremely difficult for a person to successfully demonstrate
that although he is presently competent, he was in fact incompetent sixteen months ago
at the time of the marriage. However, where such are the facts, the judges should be
allowed to make a proper determination and thus at least give the party the opportunity
to bring in evidence to establish his prior mental incompetency.
1965]
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In addition to barring a remedy to non-adjudicated mentally
incompetents, the statute is highly unrealistic with respect to those
people who are in fact under a court decree of mental incompe-
tency. Such people are not ordinarily left to roam free in society;
they are usually hospitalized and in nearly all cases would be in
contact with professional people. Thus, there would be little op-
portunity for such a person to enter into a marriage without the
knowledge or consent of a responsible partyaT
37. There are two ways in which a person can be adjudicated mentally incompetent
in Ohio. The first is pursuant to CODE § 5122.36 (Supp. 1964), which provides that
"indeterminate hospitalization pursuant to section 5122.15 ... is an adjudication of legal
incompetency .... ' Chapter 5122 provides for an initial hearing in probate court with
notice to all interested parties. At this point, the alleged incompetent is either released
or temporarily hospitalized for ninety days. This temporary hospitalization does not
operate as an adjudication of mental incompetency, and so if a person were able to
marry at this point the marriage could not be annulled on the ground of mental in-
competency. After the ninety day hospitalization, there is another hearing at which
time the party is either released or ordered indeterminately hospitalized. It is this order
of indeterminate hospitalization which operates as an adjudication of legal incompetency
pursuant to § 5122.36. Second, CODE § 5122.21 (Supp. 1964), provides that "after
a finding pursuant to section 5122.15 ... that an individual is a mentally-ill individual,
subject to hospital by court order, no continuing jurisdiction remains in the probate
court. Plenary power is granted to the officers of a public hospital to grant a discharge.
Upon discharge the hospital must notify the court which caused the judicial hospitaliza-
tion of the discharge from the hospital. If after such discharge is granted, a question
again arises as to the necessity for involuntary hospitalization of such discharged person.
he must again be examined in the probate court, under similar proceedings to those
had when he was originally found mentally ill." Thus, a hospital discharge operates as
a restoration to competency. And this is spelled out even more dearly in CODE S
5122.36 wherein it is provided that "final discharge pursuant to section 5122.21 ...
operates as a restoration of legal competency. ... . Thus, a person who has been dis-
charged from the hospital is no longer under an adjudication of legal incompetency and
is free to marry. Such a person would not come under the protective provisions of the
annulment section even though he was not in fact restored to competency.
There are only two classes o f people under an adjudication of mental incompetency
pursuant to chapter 5122 who would be free to marry. First there are those who have
escaped from a hospital. But since § 5122.26 provides procedures for the speedy re-
capture of such people, it is very unlikely that such an escapee would have either the
time or the opportunity to marry prior to recapture. In addition, the percentage of
escapees from such institutions is relatively small. The second class are those patients
on trial visit status pursuant to CODE § 5122.22. Section 5122.23 allows the head of
the hospital to prescribe any conditions which he feels are necessary prior to releasing
a person on trial visit status. While these conditions are not listed in the section, they
are quite restrictive. "For the patient under hospital jurisdiction, the opportunity to
marry without knowledge or consent of a responsible person is relatively small ...
Patients on Trial Visit are formally signed out by a responsible person who generally
agrees to keep the hospital informed about the patient. The formal signing out of a
patient on Trial Visit is not specifically included in the code, but as far as I know, almost
all state hospitals follow this procedure." Letter From Mr. David Seguichi to the Au-
thor, Jan. 29, 1965. However, the case of Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83, 84
N.E.2d 521 (1948) demonstrates what can happen even under these or similar condi-
tions. In this case, the person seeking to annul the marriage had been committed to a
mental hospital under a court adjudication of mental incompetency. The marriage took
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C. Consent by Force or Duress
A person whose consent was obtained by actual physical violence
may annul within two years after the date of the marriage.38 But
a question arises here as to the situation where the force is con-
tinuing and in fact continues beyond the two year period. In other
words, would there be grounds for annulment even though the
coerced party were falsely imprisoned? The fraud section of the
new statute gives the defrauded party "two years after the discovery
of the facts constituting fraud" to bring the annulment action.39
Surely a coerced party should have a similar length of time after the
effect of the force is no longer present.4" The common law rule
closely approaches this suggestion. Such a marriage may be rati-
fied by consummation or other overt act.4 ' However, consumma-
tion under the continued effect of coercion is not sufficient to
ratify a marriage.' It is obvious that under this rule a falsely
imprisoned spouse would be able to annul on the day of emancipa-
tion. Also, the common law ground of duress gives relief where
only threat of force is used to gain another's consent to marry.43 A
literal reading of the Ohio statute would not cover such a situation.
The Michigan statute resembles the Ohio enactment in this respect
in that it includes force as a ground for annulment, but does not
place outside of Ohio and, applying the normal conflict rule, the court held the marriage
to be valid.
The second method by which a person may be declared mentally incompetent is
under chapter 2111 of the Ohio Revised Code. Section 2111.01(D), the definition
section of the guardian chapter, contains a very broad definition of "incompetent."
Thus, it is possible for a person to be adjudicated legally incompetent'in a guardianship
proceeding without being hospitalized or placed under hospital jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 5122.15. As to the ability and probability of an incompetent under guardianship
entering into a marriage, there are two factors to be taken into consideration. First, as
Mr. Seguichi has stated: "I do believe that most people declared legally incompetent
for a mental condition are either hospitalized or on official leave status, which means
that they are still under the jurisdiction of the hospital." Letter From Mr. David Segui-
chi to the Author, Jan. 29, 1965. Second, non-hospitalized legal incompetents for
whom guardians have been appointed are generally people who are incompetent due to
infirmity of age. These people are not likely to marry. The mental incompetency
section of the annulment act therefore protects so small a group of people as to render
its effect nugatory.
38. CODE §§ 3105.31(E), .32(E) (Supp. 1964).
39. CODE §§ 3105.31(D), .32(D) (Supp. 1964).
40. For a statute providing the suggested treatment for fraud and force see MiCH.
COMP. LAWS § 552.2 (1948); see note 44 infra.
41. Norvell v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 213, 193 S.W.2d 200 (1946).
42. Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 60 So. 694 (1913).
43. Warren v. Warren, 199 N.Y. Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Contra, Capasso v.
Collona, 95 N.J.Eq. 35, 122 Ad. 378 (1923).
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provide for duress.44 But in Smith v. Smith,"5 a Michigan court
operating under an earlier version of substantially the same statute
granted an annulment for duress. This decision is especially sig-
nificant inasmuch as the Michigan statute is the type that purports
to supersede the common law and provide an exclusive remedy.46
Another statute that provides a remedy for force but not duress
is section 82 of the California Civil Code.47 This section closely
parallels section 3105.31 of the Ohio Revised Code. Like the
Michigan statute, this section also purports to be exclusive,48 and
has been judicially so declared in Curtis v. Curtis.49 But there is
one important difference between the Ohio provisions and section
82 of the California Civil Code. California has another section that
is an open end provision giving the courts leeway when needed. It
provides: "Either party to an incestuous or void marriage may pro-
ceed, by action in... court, to have the same so declared."5  Thus,
the Curtis5 decision makes section 82 the exclusive remedy only
as to those grounds covered by that section; it does not preclude
remedies not covered in section 82.52 The Ohio statute incorporated
section 82 but unfortunately neglected to include an open end
provision such as the one contained in section 80 of the California
44. MICH. COMP. IAws § 552.2 (1948), provides that "in case the consent of one
of the parties was obtained by force or fraud, and there shall have been no subsequent
voluntary cohabitation of the parties, the marriage shall be deemed void without any
... legal process." (Emphasis added.) It is elementary that under this statute, such a
marriage would not lose its void character no matter how long the force lasted - as
long as the factor of force was in fact present.
45. 51 Mich. 607, 17 N.W. 76 (1883).
46. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 552.3 (1948), provides that "when a marriage is supposed
to be void, or the validity thereof is doubted, for any of the causes mentioned in the
two . . . preceding sections, either party . . . may file a petition . . . for annulling the
same. . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is submitted that the italicized language of the
statute grants the right to annul only for the specific causes listed in the previous two
sections. Smith v. Smith, supra note 45, takes on added significance for purposes of
determining how the Ohio courts will interpret a similar statutory provision.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 82 provides that "a marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes existing at the time of the marriage: . . . That the consent of either
party was obtained by force unless such party afterwards freely cohabited with the
other ....
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 83, provides that "an action to obtain a decree of nullity of
marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section must be commenced within
the periods and by the parties as follows .. " (Emphasis added.)
49. 82 Cal. App. 2d 965, 187 P.2d 921 (1947).
50. CAL. Civ. CODE § 80. (Emphasis added.)
51. Curtis v. Curtis, 82 Cal. App. 2d 965, 187 P.2d 921 (1947).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 80; Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 Pac. 339 (1931);
People v. Glab, 13 Cal. App. 2d 528, 57 P.2d 588 (1936).
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Code. Thus, an Ohio resident whose consent to marry was obtained
by threat of great. bodily harm may well be without a remedy
in the Ohio courts because the statute provides a remedy for force
only, which does not include threat of force as does duress. In
any event such a party could well -be subjected to multiple appeals
until the question is settled by the Ohio courts.5"
D. Non-consummation of a Marriage
Section 3105.31 (F) states that for causes existing at the time
of the marriage, either party to an otherwise valid marriage may
annut within two years from the date thereof where the marriage
has not yet been consummated. While this section does not mention
fault, section 3105.32 (F) states that the action must be brought by
the "party aggrieved."54 Because of the wording of these two sec-
tions, a variety of interpretations are available. First, if the sections
are interpreted to mean failure to consummate a marriage due to
the fault of one of the parties to the marriage, they would be very
similar to the common law ground of annulment for impotency
and to 'the.-sixth section of the. California statute.55 The latter
section, which serves as a pattern for the Ohio enactment speaks of
incurable physical incapacity. But if fault was intended under the
Ohio statute, why was such a term not included in the statutory
language? Also, if fault were not intended to be a factor, it is
difficult to understand -why the action may be brought only by the
"party aggrieved." Mere consensual nonconsummation would not
create an aggrieved party. Moreover, if fault were not intended,
it is difficult to understand how any cause could exist at the time of
the marriage as it must in order to be a ground for annulment in
Ohio.
53. Mr. Judson Hoy indicated that he recalled that the Committee considered the
terms "force" and "duress" as indistinguishable. But he went on to say that "this is
questionable and I think the term duress should be included in the language." Letter
From Mr. Judson Hoy to the Author, Feb. 8. 1965.
54. CODE § 3105.32(F) (Supp. 1964).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 82, provides that "a marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes existing at the time of the marriage: ... That either party was, at the
time of the marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such
incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable." CAL. CIV. CODE § 83 provides that
"an action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the pre-
ceding section, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties, as follows ...
For cabses mentioned in section six: by the injured party, within four years after the
marriage."
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A concealed intent not to have marital intercourse has long
been a basis for annulment in Ohio as part of the ground of fraud.'
This ground makes it even more difficult to construe the section in
the Ohio statute relating to nonconsummation. An English statute
provides that a marriage shall be voidable on the ground that the
marriage has not been consummated owing to a wilful refusal of
one of the parties to consummate the marriage." This too is a
possible interpretation of the Ohio statute. But whatever the legis-
lature may have intended in section 3105.31 (F), it is obvious that
its intent was not well expressed. This section should be completely
rewritten so as to remedy the inconsistencies set forth above.
No other state grants annulment for mere non-consummation,
and it is quite doubtful that the Ohio legislature intended that such
should be the case in this state. Non-consummation is, however, a
big factor in determining whether or not to grant annulment for
some other ground. Thus, at least one author has made this obser-
vation:
Although the rule is seldom stated, the cases clearly indicate that
if the marriage has not been consummated, it may be annulled for
such fraud as would render an ordinary contract voidable, at least
in cases where the marriage is promptly disaffirmed before any
change in status has occurred.58
It is quite possible that the legislature had in mind a codification
of this idea. Where the parties are married but never live together
as man and wife, public policy should favor an expedient termina-
tion of their marriage. If support of this policy was intended by
the legislature, it is suggested that this idea be integrated into the
other sections of the annulment code. Thus, if the ground for an-
nulment is fraud, mistake, duress, jest or dare, or lack of mutual
consent, the quantum of proof required should be far less where
the marriage was never consummated. On the other hand, if in
fact the legislature desired to grant annulment to parties who
merely change their minds shortly after the marriage, the time in
which to bring such an action should be severely limited - perhaps
to six weeks from the time of the marriage.
56. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 354 (C.P. 1894).
57. British Matrimonial Causes Act § 7(1) (a) (1937).
58. Ross, supra note 24, at 744, citing Akrep v. Akrep, 1 N.J. 268, 63 A.2d 253(1949).
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III. DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT
There are three grounds provided in the Ohio annulment law59
which are also grounds for divorce," namely: fraud, bigamy, and
impotency. " Divorce is a statutory cause of action brought to
terminate an otherwise valid marriage, and is based on the fault
or misbehavior of one of the parties.62 Divorce grounds arise after
the parties have entered into the marriage, whereas annulment is
grounded on "causes existing at the time of the marriage." 3 While
it is true that statutes may provide anything within the normal
limits of constitutionality, it is nevertheless strange that the legally
diverse concepts of divorce and annulment appear to be optional
remedies in Ohio." Indeed, the divorce section6 5 in no way defines
these three grounds. As a result, the divorce courts must look to
annulment cases for definitions of these terms."
A. Policy
Ohio divorce courts have authority to grant alimony because'the
statute gives them this power. 7 But in annulment actions, the courts
59. The grounds of fraud and bigamy were not significantly changed by the enactment
of the new statute. Therefore, these grounds will not receive separate consideration.
For an excellent discussion of the Ohio law in these areas see Ross, supra note 24. Thi
problem of like grounds for divorce and annulment was not created by the new statute.
But, since it was an existing problem with which in the author's opinion the statute
failed to deal adequately, it will receive careful analysis at this point.
60. CODE § 3105.01 provides that "the court of common pleas may grant divorces for
the following causes: (A) Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of
the marriage from which the divorce is sought ... (D) Impotency ... (F) Fraudulent
Contract .. " CODE §5 3105.31(B), (D), (F), 3105.32(B), (D), (F) (Supp.
1964); see note 2 supra.
61. This is assuming that the non-consummation section, CODE § 3105.31 (F) (Supp.
1964), is judicially construed to mean impotency. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 90
which lists seven grounds for divorce, none of which include bigamy, impotency, or
fraud.
62. CODE § 3501.01 does not include mutual incompatibility as a ground for divorce.
63. CODE § 3105.31 (Supp. 1964). Vernon states that "the conceptual difference
between annulment and divorce is clear and widely accepted, and the statutory mingling
of the two seems unlikely to have arisen from any conceptual confusion. Divorce, tradi-
tionally, is granted for reasons arising after marriage and presupposes the existence of
a valid marriage status. Annulment, on the other hand, is granted as a consequence of
conditions existing at the time of the marriage .... " Vernon, Annulment of Marriage:
A Proposed Model Act, 12 J. PUB. L. 143, 146 (1963).
64. In situations where the cause arose only after the marriage was entered into, there
would be no ground for annulment since the statute makes it clear that those causes
must have existed at the time of the marriage. One would think, therefore, that where
impotency, for example, arose before the marriage, the courts would grant only annul-
ment. However, the Ohio divorce courts have not made that distinction. See McDowell
v. Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558 (1883) (dictum).
65. CODE § 3501.01; see note 60 supra.
66. Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627 (Dist. Ct. 1879).
67. CODE §5 3105.14, .17, .18. For a further discussion of the Ohio divorce laws
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do not have this power.68  Thus, in VanValley v. VanValley," a
wife who was innocent of the bigamous character of her marriage
was allowed both a divorce and alimony. Although alimony is
generally compensatory and not exemplary, this choice of remedies
is certainly justified if based upon the policy of compensating de-
serving innocent victims of bigamous or otherwise voidable mar-
riages by granting alimony. However, the two Ohio statutes do
not distinguish between the innocent victims of bigamy and the
active parties.
B. Consequences of a Poorly Drafted Statute
(1) The Problem.-The decision in Eggleston v. Eggleston °
is a good example of the consequences of a poorly drafted statute.'
In this case, the second wife was totally unaware that her marriage
was bigamous although her husband was aware of it. After a ten-
year marriage which produced two children, she sued for divorce
on the grounds of extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty. The
husband counterclaimed for annulment on the ground of bigamy
which would have deprived the wife of alimony. 2 The wife
amended her petition to include bigamy as a ground for the divorce.
The trial court granted an annulment, and denied the wife a divorce,
alimony, or child support" since these cannot be granted where a
marriage is held void. The wife appealed to the Ohio Supreme
Court which reversed, holding that divorce was the exclusive remedy
since it was provided in the divorce chapter. The effect of this case
illustrates how a spouse may be forced to go through costly, time
see Kovachy, The Evolution of Ohio Divorce Laws: Their Development to Meet Pres-
ent Day Needs, 5 W. REs. L. REV. 62 (1954).
68. Alimony is based on a spouse's duty to support which arose by virtue of a valid
marriage. In annulment, the marriage is not considered to have ever been valid. For
this reason, there is no conceptual basis for a decree of alimony pursuant to a decree of
nullity of marriage. However, since the annulment court has equity jurisdiction, it
could decree a property settlement. Conceptual distinction to the contrary, the entire
problem could be solved by allowing the granting of alimony by annulment courts
where the circumstances justify it. New York has such a provision. N.Y. CIV. PRAc
ACT ANN. § 1140-a.
69. 19 Ohio St. 588 (1869); see also Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 103
N.E.2d 395 (1952).
70. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
71. Here it was the divorce statute - not the annulment statute - which created
the difficulty.
72. The strategy here was obvious: there can be no alimony award in an annulment
decree.
73. Under CODE § 3105.33 (Supp. 1964), the court can now grant child support in




consuming appeals to get what a well drafted divorce statute would
have granted in the first instance.
Whether divorce was the exclusive remedy in Ohio for bigamy
after Egglestone4 and before passage of the new annulment act is
now academic. Clearly, it is not now the exclusive remedy after
passage of the new annulment provisions. If Eggleston7" did any-
thing to clarify the law in this area - which is questionable -
the new statute not only reopened the problem, but failed to deal
with it effectively.
(2) Recomrmendations.-It is submitted that the annulment
and divorce sections of the Ohio Revised Code should be cross refer-
enced and their application made dependent upon the circumstances
of each case. Thus, where neither party knows of the defect at
time of marriage, but it is discovered early in marriage, annulment
should be the exclusive remedy. On the "other hand, where the
defect is discovered after children have been born, or after the
parties have btheirwise 'materially changed their position by virtue
of a justifiable reliance upon" the marriage status,76 a provision for
alimony'as well as child support 77 should be included'in the annul-
merit decree.' Thus under the latter approach, a party with'a strong
religious aversion to divorce would have both religious and financial
needs satisfied in one decree.,•
Where one of the spouses is in bad faith, iLe., had knowledge
of the pending bigamous marriage, the innocent spouse should be
given an option of remedies, except in cases of early discovery by
ihe innocent spouse. In the latter situation, annulment should be
the exdusive tlmedy, bu continued 'cohabitation after discovery of
the defect ought to be given the effect of discrediting the good
faith of the innocent party.
C.' Faud and Impotency
An innocent misrepresentation by one of the parties is not fraud.
Thus, where a party did not know that he was impotent prior to
his marriage, it is impotency and not fraud which would be the
proper ground for annulment. Where fraud is the ground, there
74. Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
75. Ibid.
76. Thus, if a woman forgoes a college education or other professional training in
order to marry, she is not in the same position to earn money twenty years later as
if she had completed such training. In this type of situation, there should be some
provision for alimony even if the marriage produced no children.
77. CODE § 3105.33 provides for child support pursuant to an annulment decree.
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must have been an active perpetration of fraud. The remedy, there-
fore, should always be at the option of the defrauded party, except
of course in cases of early discovery prior to any change of position
where it would be unfair to grant alimony. In such a case annul-
ment should be the exclusive remedy.
Where the impotency was intentionally concealed, fraud is, as
noted previously, the proper ground. But where it arose subsequent
to the marriage, divorce would be the exclusive remedy - if indeed
any remedy is available. If impotency existed prior to the marriage
and such fact were unknown to the impotent party, annulment
should be the exclusive remedy. This result is suggested since the
party aggrieved will usually discover his or her mate's impotency
shortly after marriage. By way of illustration, suppose H and W
marry. Shortly thereafter, both discover for the first time that H
is impotent. W does not annul at this point as she has a right to,
but instead accepts the fact of H's impotency and remains married
to him. H is an otherwise model husband. Ten years later, W
decides to divorce H because she has tired of him. W sues for
divorce on the ground of impotency; H's defense is condonation.
Surely under these circumstances W should not be entitled to a
divorce with alimony. She should be required to bring an annul-
ment action within a short time after the marriage, or be bound
by her election to tolerate the defect.78
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE
It should be noted that if the statute is held to provide the
exclusive grounds for annulment, " the grounds of non-adjudicated
mental incompetency, marriage in jest,"0 marriage under the condi-
78. Where the parties had a bona fide belief that H's condition was curable, the time
for bringing the annulment action would not start to run until such time as would be
required to ascertain whether H's condition was incurable. In other words, W makes
no election until she knows that H's condition is incurable.
79. On this question, Mr. Judson Hoy stated that "it was not intended that this statute
provide exclusive remedies and I am going to suggest to the 106th General Assembly
that the grounds such as incest, mistake and lack of mutual consent be added and that
the courts be permitted to retain equitable jurisdiction as you point out that California
does." Letter From Mr. Judson Hoy to the Author, Feb. 8, 1965. In this same con-
nection, it is interesting to note that § 4 of the Model Annulment Act specifically states
that the act is to provide the exclusive remedy. Vernon, supra note 63, at 179. Of
the two approaches, California's provides more leeway.
80. The majority of states hold that where a marriage is entered into as a joke, in
jest, or otherwise without any real intent to marry, and this can be demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence, such marriage is voidable. Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn.
194, 175 Atl. 574 (1934); McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J.Eq. 225 (1870); Meredity v.'
Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229. 122 S.E. 520 (1924). Accord, Conley v. Conley, 28
OHIO OP. 289 (C.P. 1943), aff'd without opinion by court of appeals. In this case,
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tion of intoxication, narcotic addiction, duress, mistake, and lack of
mutual consent would no longer be grounds for annulment in Ohio.
Conceptually, lack of mutual consent, whether by mistake or design,
should be grounds for annulment, for in order for there to be a
valid marriage certainly both consent and scienter ought to be
present. Thus, if a man can show that he was so intoxicated or so
influenced by narcotics that he did not know what he was doing
at the time of marriage, he should be able to annul the marriage."'
It seems doubtful that the Ohio legislature intended to disallow
either lack of mutual consent or any of the other grounds discussed
above.8
2
A general rule of statutory construction is that statutes in dero-
gation of the common law will be strictly construed, except that
statutes remedial in nature will be construed liberally. Further,
statutes which affirm a common law rule will be construed in
accordance with the common law, unless the statute is intended to
a man married a pregnant girl in order to give the child legitimacy. The man was not
the father of the child and the parties did not intend to live together as man and wife,
nor did they ever cohabit. The court in granting the annulment lauded the man's
motives and saw no reason to punish him for such good intentions. In the same vein,
§ 8 of the Model Annulment Act provides:
A. A marriage is annullable in an action brought by either party if both
parties enter the marriage as a jest or on a dare... and this fact was known,
or should have been known, to the other party, provided the parties do not
thereafter live together as husband and wife.
B. A marriage is annullable in an action brought by the party who en-
tered the marriage with a serious contractual purpose if the other party entered
the marriage as a jest or on a dare and this fact was not known, nor should
it have been known, to the other party, provided the parties do not after the
marriage live together as husband and wife.
C. An action to annul a marriage on the ground that it was entered into
as a jest or on a dare must be brought within one year of the marriage. Ver-
non, supra note 63, at 179.
Presumably, such a marriage could be annulled in Ohio under the non-consum-
mation section, as long as the parties were able to prove non-consummation. But any-
one foolish enough to marry in jest or on a dare might well consummate the marriage
on the same foolish impulse. If such were the case, the Ohio law would in effect
punish the parties for having made such a mistake by withholding the right to annul.
This obviously is a questionable policy.
81. Wells v. Houston, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 57 S.W. 584 (1900). Section 9 of
the Model Annulment Act provides that "a marriage is annullable ...if one or both
of the parties were so intoxicated, or so under the influence of drugs, as to be unaware
of the identity of the other party or of the nature of the ceremony performed, provided
the parties did not live together as husband and wife after the incapacity induced by
intoxication or drugs has ceased." Vernon, supra note 63, at 179. In Ohio, the non-
consummation section of the annulment law would again in this situation fail to pro-
vide adequate relief where the parties consummated the marriage while yet under the
influence of a drug or alcoholic beverage.
82. See note 79 supra.
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supersede the common law.8" The Ohio annulment statute here under
consideration does not fit neatly into any of the above rules. It
is at least partially declaratory of the common law (fraud and
bigamy) but in at least two instances it supersedes the common
law (non-consummation and parental rights to annul for non-age).
Also, the statute is primarily remedial in nature. Notwithstanding
these factors, it is quite probable that the statute would be construed
as being non-exclusive in light of the utter chaos which a contrary
interpretation would promote. This has generally been the inter-
pretation throughout the country among those states which have
enacted annulment statutes. Thus, in the previously mentioned case
of Smith v. Smith,84annulment was granted on the ground of duress
where the statute only provided for annulment for consent by force.
An Indiana court operating under a statute which granted annul-
ment where a party was unable to understand the nature of the
conjugal relationship due to lack of age or ability8" held that such a
provision related only to the inability which resulted from lack of
age.86 Although the statute did not provide insanity as a ground
for annulment, the court nevertheless held that it was remedial and
therefore non-exclusive. The court then proceeded to grant annul-
ment to an adult on the ground of insanity.8" A similar result was
reached by a Massachusetts court which granted an annulment for
fraud88 even though the Massachusetts statute89 did not include
fraud as such a ground.
An interesting issue was presented in the recent Ohio appellate
83. See, e.g., Llewllyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
of Canons about How Statutes Are Construed, 3 VAN. L. REv. 395 (1950).
84. 51 Mich. 607, 17 N.W. 76 (1883).
85. IND. STAT. ANN. § 44-106 (1952), provides that "when either of the parties to
a marriage shall be incapable, from want of age or understanding, of contracting such
marriage ... the same may be declared void, on application of the incapable party ia
the case of want of age or understanding... " (Emphasis added.)
86. Wiley v. Wiley, 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N.E. 252 (1919).
87. Ibid.
88. Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203 (1916) (wife refused to have
sexual intercourse).
89. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 207, §§ 14-18 (1955). The situation is somewhat dif-
ferent here, however, since the statute does not really purport to lay down grounds for
annulment. Section 14 provides that either party may file a "libel" for annulment
where he believes the marriage to be void. Sections 15 through 17 merely relate whether
children shall be legitimate or illegitimate under various given situations: § 15 pro-
vides that children resulting from incest shall be illegitimate; § 16 makes children the
product of a marriage involving insane or non-age parties legitimate; and § 17 provides
that children resulting from a bigamous marriage will be legitimate if the bigamous
marriage was contracted in good faith. Section 18 is merely procedural. Thus, it
would seem that the statute was not intended to be exclusive.
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decision of State ex rel. Spencer v. Montgomery Bd. of Elections."
This case stands for the proposition that with respect to a "uniform"
or "adopted" act, the legislature, by adopting such an act, adopts the
judicial construction of that act in the adoptive state up to the time
of enactment. Under this doctrine, it could be argued that the Ohio
legislature adopted the California act despite the changes."' If this
argument were accepted, the Ohio courts, through the Montgom-
ery92 case, would have to give due weight to Curtis v. Curtis"3 which
held that section 82 of the California Civil Code, which parallels
section 3105.31 of the Ohio Revised Code, is the exclusive remedy.
However, as already noted, section 80 of the California Civil Code
provides an open end provision which distinguishes it from the Ohio
statute. 4 Thus, it is unlikely that the Ohio courts would hold the
annulment law to be exclusive in the sense that it precludes common
law grounds for annulment not covered in the statute. "
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question but what the authors of the Ohio annul-
ment law saw the problems discussed herein, but were hampered in
any attempt to remedy them by fear of legislative inaction. How-
ever, the statute has brought some badly needed reforms by prescrib-
ing the limits within which actions must be brought; setting out a
clearly defined procedure for bringing actions; providing for discre-
tion in a parent or guardian with respect to marriages by non-age
or mentally incompetent parties; providing for child support in an-
nulment cases;°" and allowing the issue of custody of children to be
90. 102 Ohio App. 51, 141 N.E.2d 195 (1956).
91. While the statutory words of the Ohio statute are not exactly the same, the two
acts are so similar as to leave no doubt but that the Ohio act was patterned after the
California statute. Mr. Judson Hoy was also of the opinion that "the original bill was
taken from the California law with some changed language .. " Letter From Mr. Jud-
son Hoy to the Author, Feb. 8, 1965.
92. State ex rel. Spencer v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio App. 51,
141 N.E.2d 195 (1956).
93. 82 Cal. App. 2d 965, 187 P.2d 921 (1947).
94. See note 50 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of CAL.
Civ. CODE § 80.
95. It should be noted, however, that the Ohio courts have a history of strictly con-
struing statutes to reach seemingly unjust results. See Cornell v. Bailey, 163 Ohio St.
50, 125 N.E.2d 323 (1955); Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413
(1944); Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902).
96. Such a remedy was previously open to the wife, but in a separate action. Prior
to the enactment of the annulment act, however, the wife had to bring two separate
actions: one in common pleas for the annulment, and one in juvenile court for child
support pursuant to CODE § 2105.18.
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decided in the same forum instead of requiring that question to be
settled in a juvenile court as was formerly the rule.
But the statute has failed to deal effectively with existing prob-
lems, and indeed it has created new ones. For example, in certain
circumstances parental discretion could result in injury or injustice
under a literal reading of the new law. Likewise, a non-adjudicated
mental incompetent is without a remedy. The statute has also done
little to solve the clash of the dual remedies of divorce and annul-
ment - indeed it may have created new problems. It has not pro-
vided for alimony in certain annulment situations where public pol-
icy clearly demands it. It has created a whole host of new problems
with respect to the meaning of "non-consummation." Finally, the
statute is not clear as to whether it is intended to provide an exclu-
sive remedy. This puts in jeopardy the continuing validity of the
common law grounds of mistake, lack of mutual consent, impotency,
duress, jest or dare, intoxication or narcotic addiction, and non-ad-
judicative mental incompetency.
A step in the right direction was taken by the passage of this
statute; however, it is greatly in need of further refinement. The
legislature must again act on this matter if the statute is to be given
its proper effect.
ANDREW M. FISHMAN
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